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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UT.AH,
Plaintiff-Jlespondent,
Y.

KENNETH DE
BA U:U,

I
!
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H.OSEN"-

zr--.
I'
l an'-, 1Vi'c ll ant.
_Jc.1c111

Case No.
11315

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Kenneth De Mar Rosenbaum,
appeals his conviction for the crime of burglary in the
third degree and from a denial of a motion for a new
trial in the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County,
Utah, the Honorable :Marcellus K. Snow presiding.
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The appellant was charged jointly with Jeffrey
Lee Hobbs with the crime of burglary in the third
l

degree. He was tried in the absence of his co-defendant,
who had been committed to a federal narcotics hospitaJ.
The appellant was found guilty by jmy verdict of the
crime charged and was sentenced to the term in the
Utah State prison prescribed by law. The trial court
denied the appellant's motion for a new trial.

RELIEF SOGGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the judgment of the trial
court be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The .Medical Center Garage located on South
Temple and Fifth East, Salt Lake City, Utah, was
burglarized August 18, 1967, and approximately thirtyfive dollars was taken from a soft drink vending machine. (R.64-65)
A complaint signed August 25, 1967, charged the
appellant and Jeffrey Hobbs with the crime of burglary
in the third degree.
The appellant had a preliminary hearing separate
from his co-defendant and was bound over to District
Court for trial.
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-17 (1953)
the appellant filed notice of alibi January 29, 1968.
(R.14)
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Immediately after the burglary each of the wituesses gave descriptions of the persons near the soft
drink vending machine at the time of the burglary to
Dave Bradford, a poiice officer of the Salt Lake City
Police Department. Although the descriptions differed
in detail, Officer Bradford was able to select a set of
photographs from which each of the witnesses identified
the appellant as the person present during the burglary.
( R. 76)
Officer Bradford testified that l\lr. Beatie, the
lessee and operator of the burglarized garage, had described the person present during the burglary as having ta toos on both arms. ( R. 78) Under cross-examination, the appellant acknowledged having tatoos on both
arms. (R.101)
Mr. Mike Beatie testified that he had checked the
soft drink vending machine located in his garage on
the morning of August 18, 1967, and it had contained
approximately thirty-five dollars. (R.63-64)
About 3:00 o'clock p.m. on the same day, Mr.
Beatie saw the appellant, Kenneth Rosenbaum, and
Jeffrey Hobbs "hanging around the coke machine."
(R.65) Becoming suspicious, Mr. Beatie moved to a
position where he could watch them. As he watched, the
door to the soft drink vending machine swung open.
(R.65)
Mr. Beatie yelled to his employee, Robert Best,
and the hrn men ran from the building. (R.55) An im-
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mediate inventory of the yeuding machine revealed that
the money box was missing. ( R.66)
Robert Best pursued both me11, apprehending
Jeffrey Hobbs, while the other person, later identified
by Mr. Best as the appellant, escaped in a nearby car
driven by a third person. (R.91)
Brent Pack, owner and operator of a business located in the .Medical Center Garage, was present at
the time of the burglary. He testified that he recognized
the appellant as one of the persons present at the time
of the burglary ( R.83, 94, 87) and that the two men
looked suspicious. He told Mike Beatie to "keep an eye
on them." (R.84)
Kenneth Rosenbaum offered as his defense an
alibi that he ·was with two friends on the day and at
the time of the burglary (R.98), and that he was not
with Jeffrey Hobbs 011 the day of the burglary. (R.99)
The alibi witness, Clarence Moore, testified that
the appellant was with him during the day and time
of the burglary and that they did not go near the Medical Center that day. (R.109)
The jury, after receiving testimony on behalf of
the state and the appellant, found the appellant guilty
as charged.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT IS NOT REYERSIBLE ERROR FOR
THE TRIAL COURT TO GIVE CAUTIONARY
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DEFENSE OF
ALIBI.
A. Instruction number 6 did not shift to the appellant the burden of establishing his alibi.
13. Instruction number 6 did not shift from the
state the burden of proving each element of the crime
of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt.
C. Any error in instruction number 6 was corrected by other instructions.
D. Any error in instruction number 6 is not substantial error requiring a new trial within the meaning
of U tab Code Ann. § 77 -38-3 ( 5) ( 1953) .
These argument are discussed together.
The prosecution requested and the trial court instructed the jury:
Due to the very nature of the defense of alibi,
in that it is easily fabricated and difficult to disproYe, you shoul~l consider it with caution.
It is conceded that the defense of alibi is a legitimate
and rroper defense. State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67
P.2d 647 ( 1937). 'Vhile an instruction which tends
to disparage or belittle the defense of alibi may be
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erroneous, there is room to differ as to what constitutes
a disparaging instruction to the defense of alibi .
. . . in some jurisdictions it is settled that there
is nothing improper in instructions of a kind
which, generally speaking, may be characterized
as being merely cautionary as to the defense of
alibi. 146 A.L.R. 1377 at 1379 ( 1943)
The primary objection to giving instructions which
tend to disparage the defense of alibi is that they tend
to have the effect of shifting the burden of proving
the alibi to the person asserting the alibi.
In State v. Wilson, 238 Minn. 451, 57 N.\V.2d
412 ( 1953) quoting favorably State v. Duddy, 15~
Minn. 179, 188 N."\V. 261 (1922), the court held:
"\Ve find no reversible error in this instruction
It did not have the effect of casting upon
defendant the burden of establishing the alibi
as a defense, nor in any proper view of impairing
or negatiYing the general presumption of innocence. The Court was quite clear in placing the
burden of proof on the state, and instructing the
jury that no verdict of guilty could be returned,
except they found from all the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant was a party
to the commission of the crime. See also State
v. Keezer, 274 .Minn. 292, 143 N.,V.2d 627
(1966).
It is true that the defendant has the burden of
coming forward with evidence which would be sufficient
••• 1

1 "
It will be remembered always that an alibi is a
th~t ·is easily fabricated and hard to disprove;. but, if
it is a good defense, I say that merely to caut10n ~he
and weigh
consi<ler the evidence on both sides
fully."
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defense
!?roved,
~ury to
1t care·

lo permit the trial court to give instructions as to the
defense of alibi if so requested. But to be a ground for
a jury to find the defendant not guilty, the defense
of alibi must be established only to the degree that it
would lead reasonable men to conclude that there was
reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, i.e., that
the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt one
of the elements of the crime charged. See 146 A.L.R.
1377 at 1382 ( 1942) and cases cited.

Thus it was held in State v. Waid, supra, and
State v. JJThitel,lJ, 100 Utah 13, llO P.2d 337 (1941),
that it is error for a trial court to give any instruction
which tends to shift the burden of proving the defense
of alibi to the defendant, since it is the law in Utah that
the burden of proof is always on the prosecution and
uever shifts to the defense during the trial. See People
v. Tracy, 1 Utah 343 ( 1876).

In Instruction No. 8 ( R.31) the trial court said
in part:
... it is necessary in order to justify a verdict
of guilty that each and every one of the elements
enumer;ded he proven to your .rntisfaction and
beyond a reasonable doubt. You are further instructed that in the event the State so proves
each and every element by the proof as aforesaid, then and in that event you would be warranted in finding the defendant guilty. (Emphais added) . . .

If ... any element lacks the proof as aforesaid . . . it ~vould be your duty to find the def enda ut not guilty of the offense.
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The instructions in the instant case clearly placed
on the State the burden of proving each element of the
crime. In instruction No. 6 ( R.29) the jury was told:
The <lefeudanl KENNETH ROSENBAUM in this case has introduced evidence tending to prove that he was not present at the time
and place of the commission of the alleged offense, for which he is here on trial. If after a
consideration of all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt whether or not the defendant
was present at the time the crime was committed,
he is entitled to an acquital.
In instruction No. 13 ( R.36) the jury was told:
You are instructed that the defendant is a
competent witness in his own behalf and his testimony should be receiYed and given the same
consideration as you give to that of any other
witness .... you should weigh his testimony the
same as you weigh the testimony of any other
witness.
It does not appear from the instructions that the
burden of proving that the alleged crime was committed by the appellant was ever shifted from the prosecution. Instruction number 7 (R.30) which cautioned
the jury that the defense of alibi is easily fabricated
and difficult to disprove, and therefore should be considered with caution, did not have the effect of shifting
to the defense the burden of proving the defendant's

alibi.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that instruction
number 7 was given in error since it informed the jury
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of such matters as they, as men of affairs, already knew.
Thus in /l'ielder et al v. United States, 277 Fed 832
(8th Cir. 1915) the court held that it was not error for
the trial court to have instructed the jury as follows:
An alibi is a proper defense in a criminal
case; it is a defense which as men of affairs you
know is more easy to build up than some other
defenses. Also see People v. Marcus, 253 Mich.
410, 235 N.,V. 202 (1931); State v. TVoolworth,
H8 Kan. 180, 81P.2d43 (1938), cert. den., 317
U.S. 671 (1942).
This case recognized that cne's i·cason dictates that an
alibi defense can be coucocte<l with relative ease among
friends or family in their desire to help a person with
whom a close personal relationship exists.
In the case now at hand instruction number 7
only pointed out the obvious to the jury, something
which in all probability had already been recognized.
Based on this reasonable assumption, instruction number 7 cannot be said to have been prejudicial to defendant's substantial rights. Under Utah law, a new
trial is to be granted only when an error has been made
which substantially affects the rights of the defendant.
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-3 ( .5) which states that
a new trial will be granted a defendant only:
"Then the court has misdirected the jury in
a matter of law, or has erred in the decision of
any question of law arising during the cour~e
of the trial, or has done or allowed any act m
the cause prejudicial to the substantial rights
of the defendant.
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The state submits that jury instruction number 7
did not affect defendant's substantial rights so as to
prejudice these rights. Hence, a new trial under the
statute should not be granted.
CONCLUSION
The appellant was identified by three witnesses
as the person present at the scene of the burglary. From
their descriptions of the appellant the i1westigating
officers selected an array of photographs from which
these witnesses were able to identify the appellant as
the person present at the time of the burglary. The
trial court instructed the jury that the burden of proving every element of the crime of burglary was on the
prosecution, and that the def endaq.±: \Vas a competent
witness in his own behalf whose testimony should be
gi,,en the same consideration as that of any other
witness.
The questioned instruction did not shift the burden
of proof nor prejudice defendant's substantial rights.
Therefore, it is submitted that this court affirm the
verdict and judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,

PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GERALD G. GUNDRY
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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